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Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms: 
The Role of (Dys)Function in Long-term Inter-organizational Relationships 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the dynamic interplay of formal/informal governance mechanisms, in terms of 
functional and dysfunctional consequences for both sides of the dyad, in long-term inter-
organizational relationships. Using two longitudinal cases of UK defence sector procurement 
(warship commissioning) we move beyond notions of complementarity and substitution in governance 
towards a more nuanced view where the governance mix of inter-organizational relationships can be 
convergent or divergent. Our findings, showing that relationships can exhibit functional and 
dysfunctional behavior simultaneously, lead us to conclude that mismatches in governance 
mechanisms can be positive as well as negative. In building a context dependent understanding of 
governance we both summarize the (dys)functions associated with formal and informal governance 
mechanisms, and explore their impact on relationship exchange performance over time. 
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Introduction 
It is widely accepted that inter-organizational exchange performance is, in part, a consequence of the 
effective coordination of formal and informal governance mechanisms (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Faems et al., 2008; Guérard et al., 2013). Although the comparative 
functionality of different governance mechanisms has been extensively documented, their dynamic 
interplay (Zheng et al., 2008; Cao and Lumineau 2015) and, critically, their relative (dys)functionality 
over time, remains less well understood. For example, formal governance has positive functionalities, 
such as the coordination and control of the exchange between two parties, but can also lead to 
dysfunctions, such as overregulation and hold-up problems (Ring and van der Ven, 1994; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Anderson and Decker, 2005). Our study therefore addresses the following research 
question: How do formal and/or informal governance mechanisms make functional and/or 
dysfunctional contributions to exchange performance over time? 
Moreover, there is demand for a greater ‘context-dependent understanding’ of governance, 
including the exploration of exchange governance in complex and uncertain operating environments 
(Filochev and Nakajima, 2010, p. 593). Our study seeks to contribute to this stream of literature 
through analysis of two extended inter-organizational relationships, enacted by the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and its partnering organization during the commissioning and support of UK naval 
ships from 1990 to 2010. Our longitudinal study follows two inter-organizational relationships in the 
defence sector which span nearly 20 years (Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990). Based on rich primary 
and secondary datasets including 40 interviews with senior managers, this paper offers a rare 
longitudinal and dyadic perspective of governance mechanisms interplay, extending prior studies 
conducted at one point in time and presented from one organization’s perspective (Vlaar et al., 2007). 
The dynamics of our study demonstrate that governance mechanisms are complementary 
when, but only when, they are functional for both parties. Because we explore functions and 
dysfunctions over time we provide a dynamic perspective that makes three contributions to extant 
governance mechanisms literature. First, we demonstrate that governance mechanisms can deviate 
from each other, i.e. one form of governance can be functional while the other is dysfunctional at the 
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same point in time. This offers a more nuanced perspective on the dynamics of governance 
mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships and advances extant studies (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Second, we show that (dys)functions of governance can converge or 
diverge between parties in an exchange, so that what is functional for one party might be 
dysfunctional for the other party. While we might expect this of formal governance (Williamson, 
1985), it is more surprising to find that this also applies to relational governance as extant studies has 
vastly emphasized the positive functions of relational governance (e.g. Zaheer et al., 1998; Cao and 
Lumineau, 2015). Third, we suggest that performance is a function of the management of 
(dys)functions within each form of governance over the relationship lifetime. We reveal not only 
outcomes in terms of exchange performance, but more critically the causes of change in performance 
through combinations of (dys)functional contractual and relational behavior during each relationship 
phase. 
 The paper is organized as follows: the conceptual background explores formal and informal 
governance mechanisms, their functional and dysfunctional performance implications and reflects on 
their dynamic interplay. Our methods are described in terms of research approach, data collection and 
analysis. The fieldwork presents two longitudinal cases of defence sector inter-organizational 
relationships followed by conceptual development and discussion. The paper concludes with 
theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and avenues for future research.   
 
Conceptual background 
Extant literature distinguishes between governance related to the political, social and legal 
environment of an economic system, and that related to arrangements “between economic units that 
govern the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or compete” (Davis and North, 1971, p. 6-7). 
The latter concept is referred to as the governance structure, distinguishing between classical market, 
hybrid contracting, and hierarchy. By contrast, governance mechanisms refer to the formal and 
informal rules of exchange between partners (North, 1990; Zenger et al., 2002; Vandaele et al., 2007). 
Although defined as fields of research in their own right, literature which combines governance 
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mechanisms, degrees of formalization and inter-organizational relationship performance is scant. A 
common association with governance typically involves the corporate sector, where managerial 
choices grant control and verify institutional legitimacy towards achieving financial performance for 
shareholders (e.g. Poulsen, 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), engage in mergers and acquisitions 
activity, stock market prediction and company board composition (Goergen et al., 2008), and regulate 
markets through contracts or organizational hierarchy (Coase, 1952). Yet, the study of governance 
goes beyond formalization, i.e. organizational structure, contract design and regulation (Williamson, 
1975; 1996; Macneil, 1978), and includes more agency-based or behavioral aspects of inter-
organizational relationships such as the role played by trustful relations over time (Dekker, 2004; Lui, 
2009). Taken together, identifying combinations of governance mechanisms which improve long-term 
performance is the subject of considerable debate, particularly where performance is defined in terms 
of an extended and beneficial relationship exchange between two or more organizations (Gulati and 
Nickerson, 2008; Zaheer et al., 1998). Hence, we develop our theoretical underpinnings from the 
performance-based perspective of governance (Leiblein, M. 2003; Coles et al., 2001; Williamson, 
1996), combining inter-organizational relationships (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
and the (dys)functionality of governance mechanisms interplay (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Cao and 
Lumineau, 2015). Our starting point is that previous studies have distinguished between two types of 
governance mechanisms: formal or contractual, and informal or relational.  
Formal approaches, typified by legal contracts set up with very specific terms and clauses in 
order to avoid conflicts of interpretation (Luo, 2002), can foster greater efficiency, and reduce costs 
by clarifying activities between contracting parties and by mitigating potential opportunism 
(Nooteboom, 1996; Zaheer and Harris, 2006). As it is practically impossible to foresee every possible 
future contingency, effective contracting also includes clear principles and procedures on how to best 
manage potential future contingencies (Stipanowich, 1998). This in turn relies on high degrees of 
programmability of tasks and behaviors and the measurability of outcomes ex-ante (Das and Teng, 
2001).  
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Informal approaches are derived from - and reinforced by - trust, commitment and social 
capital between partnering organizations (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011; Child and Möllering, 2003) 
acting as behavioral guidelines that enforce social obligation during the exchange (Heide, 1994; 
Cannon et al., 2000). Here, future contingencies are addressed by flexibility and increased 
information sharing procedures between partnering organizations (Zaheer and Harris, 2006). 
Relational governance mechanisms often rely on partnering organizations having “greater levels of 
confidence in the predictability of each other’s actions” (Gulati and Singh, 1998: 790). Yet, 
establishing and nurturing relational governance mechanisms can be time- and cost-consuming 
(Bachmann, 2001; Larson, 1992). 
Function and dysfunction in governance mechanisms 
In general terms all governance mechanisms can have a range of positive ‘functionalities’; from 
safeguarding interests, clarifying roles and responsibilities and multi-party coordination, to adaptation, 
learning and sense-making. Equally however, governance mechanisms can have a range of negative 
‘dysfunctionalities’ that act as potential impediments to exchange performance and the overall inter-
organizational relationship. For example, even the most well-intentioned formal control efforts can be 
derailed by exploitation (arising from weaknesses such as incomplete contract design or intellectual 
property rights: Williamson, 1975; 1996) or coordination failure (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011), 
particularly when uncertainty, complexity, and transaction duration increases (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994). Prior studies highlight the negative effect of incomplete contracts, leading to conflicts and 
disagreements between partnering organizations when interpreting the contract (e.g. Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998; Baiman and Rajan, 2002). Likewise, formal governance mechanisms may lead to 
more ‘cumbersome, overregulated, and impersonal processes’ (Beck and Kieser, 2003, p. 794) that, 
in turn, may hinder creativity and flexibility because of over-regulated and prescriptive procedures 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996; Weber and Mayer, 2011). Similarly, informal governance mechanisms can 
create their own dysfunctions; from ‘cognitive lock-in’ and relational inertia (potentially causing 
organizations to honour obligations which may conflict with the pursuit of self-interest and risk 
avoidance: Gulati, 1995; Leenders and Gabbay, 1999). Other studies draw out the potential loss of 
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objectivity, sub-optimal information search, and poor decision-making, leading to missed market 
opportunities such as new technology innovations (Uzzi, 1997; Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Anderson 
and Jap, 2005). Table 1 provides an overview of identified functions and dysfunctions in governance 
mechanisms. 
< Insert ‘Table 1’ about here > 
The dynamic interplay of governance mechanisms 
The relationship between these different types of governance mechanism (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; 
Roehrich and Lewis, 2014) is more contested. Some authors argue that contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms act as substitutes (e.g. Cavusgil et al., 2004; Gulati, 1995; Sitkin and Roth, 
1993); contracts obviate the need for setting up and maintaining social relationships whereas, 
conversely, trusting relationships facilitate governance without the costs and complexity associated 
with contracts (Adler, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), while others present evidence to suggest 
the complementary nature of formal/informal governance mechanisms (e.g. Das and Teng, 2001; Luo 
2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Klein et al., 2005; Zheng et al., 2008; Cao and Lumineau, 2015). 
Bachmann (2001), for example, suggests that lengthy contract negotiations and detailed contracts are 
not necessarily a signal of distrust. Clearly defined contracting may actually support the development 
of long-term, trusting relationships by narrowing ‘the domain and severity of risk to which an 
exchange is exposed and thereby encourage cooperation and trust’ (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, p. 708). 
Moreover, relationship continuity and ongoing cooperation may be vital in addressing contractual 
gaps. As Möllering (2005, p. 291) concludes, trust and control do not merely co-exist, but enter a 
‘reflexive relationship to each other when they form the basis of positive expectations’. It is important 
to note that, although such observations are clearly anchored in a processual view of governance, a 
full discussion of the interplay of governance mechanisms (and their relative (dys)functions) over 
time goes beyond simple discussions of whether formal and informal mechanisms act as substitutes or 
complements. To date few studies have fully investigated the dynamic characteristics of this interplay 
and its consequences for exchange performance. Most studies of governance and exchange 
performance have considered individual governance mechanisms (e.g. Vanneste and Puranam 2010; 
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Caldwell et al., 2017). Important exceptions include Faems et al., (2008), and Dimitratos et al., (2009) 
who studied the incentives and performance monitoring schemes adopted by small-medium Greek 
firms seeking to collaborate with international partners. They identified distinct patterns of 
governance ‘mix’ and suggested that combinations of formal and informal cooperation were 
associated with improved performance outcomes. This dualistic view is supported by Luo’s (2002, p. 
903) examination of joint ventures in dynamic markets, arguing that the use of contracts and building 
cooperation are ‘not substitutes but complements in relation to... performance’. 
 Our ex-ante understanding of the performance implications of exchange (micro) governance 
(Leiblein, 2003; Coles et al., 2001; Williamson, 1996), stems from Cao and Lumineau’s (2015, p.15) 
observations – based on a significant meta-analysis of 149 studies – that “contracts, trust and 
relational norms jointly improve satisfaction and relationship performance”. In other words, we begin 
our conceptualization with the assertion that formal (contractual) and informal (relational) 
mechanisms work together (in some, as yet poorly understood, combinations) to deliver performance. 
Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of governance interplay where the starting point is a functional 
relational and contractual relationship between two organizations (‘w’) which can either remain static 
or switch to become dysfunctional over time. The shift from function to dysfunction therefore can be 
represented as one of three alternatives, either: functional relational and dysfunctional contractual 
governance (‘x’), or dysfunctional contractual and relational governance (‘y’), or dysfunctional 
relational and functional contractual governance (‘z’). We note that positions ‘w’ and ‘y’ represent 
convergent positions, while ‘x’ and ‘z’ represent divergent positions, where convergence is defined by 
a match between the functionality of governance mechanisms.  
< Insert ‘Figure 1’ about here > 
Figure 1 therefore suggests that long-term relationships will display elements of both formal and 
informal governance, and that these will vary over time and across the dyad. Our paper goes beyond 
notions of complements and substitutes towards a more detailed understanding of their functions and 
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dysfunctions across dyadic relationship lifecycles, thus offering a fine-grained analysis of inter-
organizational relationship governance. 
 
Methodology 
To engage with how governance mechanisms interact, playing functional and dysfunctional roles in 
achieving intended performance outcomes, a longitudinal multiple case study approach was adopted 
(Langley, 1999; Berends et al., 2011; Canato et al., 2013). The multiple case study approach was 
chosen as appropriate for examining poorly understood phenomena (Yin, 1994) and where research is 
used to probe deeply into processes by collecting data of complex, ambiguous, real-time, and 
retrospective interpretations of events and organizational contexts (Langley, 1999; Drori and Honig, 
2013). The purpose of our cases is not to show the frequency of occurrence of a specific phenomenon, 
but to highlight cases of theoretical and practical importance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stuart et al., 2002).  
Research setting and case selection   
The research setting for our study is the acquisition of new ship assets for the UK Royal Navy, and 
our unit of analysis is the dyadic relationship between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and a private 
contractor: a large multinational who played the lead industrial role on both investigated cases. We 
examine long-term inter-organizational relationships that are designed to deliver performance 
outcomes. Specifically, we undertook a chronological study of all major classes of warship platform 
before selecting two relationships for further examination. Our sampling logic follows Pettigrew’s 
(1990) suggestion to select polar types, resulting in the platforms for a small patrol ship and large 
warship being selected for investigation. The patrol ship was generally regarded by the joint public-
private project team at the time as a successful venture in terms of achieving a high performance 
outcome by delivering a high number of days (i.e. >300) per year each ship was available to go to sea. 
By the same measure, the larger warship was not seen as successful, delivering only around half the 
expected days (i.e. <150). In other words, the two cases were deliberately selected based on 
performance criteria, where we wanted to explore the impact and roles of (dys)functional governance 
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mechanisms while controlling for performance outcomes. In this sense, we are less concerned with 
direct comparisons between the two cases but from the theoretical insights that might be derived from 
both with regards to the interplay of governance mechanisms (dys) functions over time. 
Each relationship was investigated from both the perspective of the buyer (the MoD) and the 
same private contractor during the commissioning process (i.e. design, build, launch, and sea trials) 
and subsequent maintenance activities. The contractor’s role was as prime industrial partner, typically 
providing around 30-50 staff for the duration of the project dependent on ship size, which included 
coordination of specialist equipment suppliers. The MoD deployed similar staff numbers, performing 
a management liaison role with industry in their defence equipment acquisition and in-service support 
offices near Bristol (UK). The cases are linked in that they both follow the introduction of new 
procurement policy in the UK defence sector termed Contracting for Availability (CFA) intended to 
shift supplier focus from ‘simple’ asset design and build to delivery of ongoing performance 
outcomes such as sea-going availability and through-life ship support (MoD, 2005). In this paper 
performance is measured in two ways. First, (objective) asset performance was quantified by the 
number of days per year a vessel spends at sea over the time spent harbor-side undergoing 
maintenance. Second, the richer (and inevitably subjective) exchange performance was captured via 
the primary data collection process; summing assessment of both formal contractual documentation 
with opinions regarding relational mechanisms such as critical incidents, levels of trust, sense of 
partnership, degree of information exchange and resolution of problems (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008).    
Data collection and analysis  
Fieldwork involved 40 interviews between 60 to 120 minutes duration (see Table 2, Appendix), with 
key stakeholders including naval personnel (e.g. Captain, Commander) and civilian contractors, 
ranging from senior managers (e.g. Managing Director, Chief Engineer) to technical specialists (e.g. 
Support Manager, Engineer). We ensured diversity of interviewees from partnering organizations who 
had knowledge of the relationships under analysis, different organizational hierarchy levels and across 
the relationship’s history, following recommendations by Berends et al., (2011). The findings were 
supported by secondary data and observations based on five site visits and a range of reports (e.g. 
Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms 
11 
 
Nott, 1981; SDR, 1998; Croft et al., 2001; MoD, 2005; 2006; 2007; NAO, 2011; Rankin, 2013; Jones 
et al., 2014). This helped to address validity and reliability problems and to overcome the bias 
introduced by any respondents’ memory lapse or distortion (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A 
typical interview commenced with questions regarding the interviewee and organizational 
background. Interviewees were asked to talk about capabilities, performance, coordination, 
contractual arrangements, trusting relationships and the defence environment.  
Data collection and analysis activities were conducted in parallel. We began with an open 
coding approach, analyzing transcripts, reports, and notes line-by-line, and identifying key categories 
of interest (e.g. contracts, trust, performance, functions and dysfunctions). As a second step, we 
deployed axial coding, aiming to build relationships between categories (Strauss, 1987). Following 
this, we deployed a selective coding strategy focusing on key codes driving our analysis and sense-
making processes. The findings are structured following an issue-organized analytical chronology 
(Berends et al., 2011). This approach to presenting longitudinal data facilitated the analysis of the 
dynamics, relationships of functions, dysfunctions, governance mechanisms, and exchange 
performance over time, resulting in a clearer overall relationship development story. Detailed stories 
were constructed from the fine-grained data we collected to achieve high accuracy and to go beyond 
surface description to elicit the generative mechanisms behind their progression (Van de Ven, 2007). 
 
Presentation of findings 
Case 1 Patrol ship: early phase (1997-1999)  
Our first case examines the functions and dysfunctions of governance mechanisms across all phases 
during the commissioning of a new patrol ship built for the MoD by the contractor, seeking to expand 
its portfolio. The case provides an early illustration of CFA or logistical support as public policy 
shifted towards a more collaborative approach with the private sector (SDR, 1998). The move to 
transform public-private relationships towards being smarter, more efficient and better connected 
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began in the 1990s (King, 1990; SDR, 1998), with the MoD seeking to engage more closely with 
industry to spread the cost and risk of new equipment programs (Sanderson, 2009).  
In the late 1990’s the MoD had five ageing coastal patrol ships providing a low level of 
service availability. All were difficult and expensive to maintain yet the ministry could not get 
approval from the government for their replacement (RN Commander, 2009). During a private dinner 
in 1997 between the public Director of Shipping and a senior executive from the contractor, it was 
revealed by the shipbuilder that it had “A hole in its order book” and wanted to replace the current 
ships (Contractor Manager, 2006). The contractor was eager to get involved in maintenance and repair 
activities: “We wanted to get into support” and saw great potential for development of its maritime 
logistical support capability, proposing that three new vessels could do the work of the original five, 
using a leasing mechanism to save the MoD payment upfront (DE&S, 2009). 
The functional aspects of contractual governance are represented by the clear aims of the 
MoD who wanted more responsibility for support to be devolved to private industry. There was 
recognition by senior policymakers that “A significant move must be made to make warships 
cheaper” (RN Commander, 2009; SDSR, 2010). The CFA initiative originated from government civil 
servants who were inspired by Defence Industrial Strategy policy to leverage more private sector 
capability (MoD, 2005). Responsibility for providing warship support services such as stores, 
engineering training and IT systems was to be given to industry. A model was conceived as an aid for 
contractors, which started with traditional support and progressively involved greater responsibility 
(e.g. holding spare parts), towards full contracting for capability as the highest level. Although 
collaboration on the new patrol ship required a fully binding contract prepared by marine lawyers, 
increasing emphasis was placed on partnering principles with industry (MoD, 2005; MoD 2007b). 
The MoD proposed that it engaged with the contractor on the basis of “No blame, no surprises” and 
adopted performance-based payment using key indicators to gauge level of service (DE&S, 2009). 
Relations between the ministry and contractor were initially mutually explorative and aspirational. 
The MoD intended for CFA to be an opportunity to remove bureaucracy, free up resources and 
improve communications. The contractor reciprocated by recognizing the MoD’s predicament of 
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“Having no money” and proposed a solution to provide new ships with “No colossal outlay” 
(Contractor Manager, 2006). Using the novel leasing concept, agreement was reached to provide a 
complete package of design, construction, and long-term support. 
Mid phase (1999-2003) 
Dysfunctional behavior in the relationship began to emerge in 1999 with the MoD insisting on putting 
the patrol ship contract out to tender: “We did not want one systems integrator dominating” (MoD, 
Snr Manager, 2006). This apparent reversal away from the proposed new practices effectively delayed 
the program by several years which in turn “Burnt a bit of the relationship” (Contractor Manager, 
2006). Decisions in the past made by the MoD over procurement of naval equipment on ships had 
lacked innovation by focusing on price, and meant the ministry had developed a reputation for short-
termism. The old coastal patrol ships still in service were now having a detrimental effect on new 
repair practices because the contractor felt they were cheap and had been “Procured with no thought 
as to how [they were] to be maintained in the future” (MoD Commander, 2009). 
The commissioning process of the patrol ship after it was finally built in 2001 was a complex 
combination of contractual control and watershed events, with the MoD adopting more integrative 
and less rigidly defined working patterns (SDR, 1998; MoD, 2005): “We transferred significant risk 
to the supplier. I can see no other way than CFA of realizing this level of capability…you can cut 
away whole chunks of bureaucracy” (MoD Manager, 2009). Several dysfunctional aspects of 
relational governance also emerged in the relationship. One issue stemmed from deep-rooted beliefs 
based on past experience by the contractor that the MoD’s procurement processes were fundamentally 
bureaucratic. A legacy of conservatism persisted towards contracting which meant some senior 
defence personnel lacked a sense of vision. For example, the response by one government minister to 
the lease style contract was that it was “Novel and contentious” (Contractor Manager, 2006). Further, 
when the patrol ships were commissioned, the cost of holding inventory items such as engines was 
passed directly to the contractor. Hence the first year of operations under the new CFA support 
contract was at times “Very painful…with arguments” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011, ibid). 
Engineers from the contractor tried to expedite outstanding ship defects with copies of the contract 
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fastened to their clipboards. The logic of partnering had not been sufficiently defined in the agreement 
(MoD, 2007b), resulting in the initial operating period being “A nightmare”. Conflicting 
understanding over CFA implementation created intense and difficult interactions, compounded by 
deeply held beliefs by contractor personnel based on their past experience of working with the MoD.   
Late phase (2003-2005) 
As the new patrol ship entered its second year of operation under CFA, more formal roles and 
responsibilities became defined in an internal policy document. The creation of an integrated project 
team was also introduced by the MoD as an attempt to bring all relevant public and private sector 
stakeholders together to manage projects more effectively “From cradle to grave’ (Moore and Antill, 
2001, p.179). The policy described the behavior expected from both organizations during their 
participation on the project (e.g. ‘No surprises’) and to maximize teamwork. The MoD decided to 
increase the emphasis on partnering principles to improve the CFA support process. Appropriate 
behavior from all personnel on the team was now being presented in terms of supporting “Mutual 
benefit, openness and trust, exchange of information and ongoing innovation” (MoD, 2005). During 
this phase when the team came up against obstacles, they tried to develop a standard procedure 
alongside the contract through “Trial it, learn the lessons, and record it by introducing it into the 
contract” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011, ibid). It was established over time that while the 
contract could be used as a means to frame problems such as the development of revised metrics, 
there was also the possibility of “Putting the contract to one side”. Whilst recognizing an agreement 
had to be reached between the two organizations, trying to adhere too closely to the contract was 
obstructive for the contractor trying to deliver on metrics defined exclusively by the new working 
arrangements. A further 18 months were required for the contractor’s engineers to stop old habits such 
as expediting, and to put the contract aside while consulting with the team. At times, contractor 
personnel could “See no other way” to transfer risk from the MoD to the private sector (Contractor 
Manager, 2009). Although leasing heralded the start of more flexible working between the public and 
private organization, CFA did not suit older ships already in service, particularly those with 
obsolescent or faulty equipment requiring constant attention. Given that CFA yielded high levels (i.e. 
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95%) of sea-time availability for the patrol ship, both the MoD and contractor considered the new 
method of working together to be successful.  
In summary, the early relationship phase of the case can be described as mutually explorative 
and aspirational, with the contractor providing considerable input to engage with the MoD to secure 
the new contract (Table 3). Yet attempts to implement the new contract during the mid phase resulted 
in intense and often conflicting interactions as the contractor tried to work around MoD bureaucracy 
and delay caused by the insistence on tendering. The late phase saw a renegotiation in the relationship 
and changes in the way the contract was applied with freer information exchange and clearer 
definition of responsibilities between the two organizations. The recovery of the relationship in the 
late phase, where functional formal and informal behavior was matched in both organizations, is 
significant because it contrasts markedly with the next case. Here the same contractor embarks on a 
similar program with the MoD, but for a significantly larger design of vessel. 
< Insert ‘Table 3’ about here > 
Case 2 Large warship: early phase (2003-2006) 
This case illustrates the first large warship of its type to be built for several decades in the UK. Almost 
five times the size of the patrol ship and equipped with the latest electronic ship safety, navigation, 
and missile guidance systems, first steel was cut in 2003. The proposed construction and support 
mechanism was “A very bold initiative” that adopted Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), based on 
CFA, but where the contractor also takes full control over all on-board systems (Commander RN, 
2009). The same contractor as in the patrol ship won the contract to design and build the new warship 
primarily on the basis of past performance. The MoD’s plan was to incentivize the contractor to 
design and build a class of vessel that was cost effective in supporting through-life maintenance over 
longer periods (i.e. 3-5 years) than in the past (i.e. 1 year), using an integrated support solution.  
Despite concerns by some senior MoD personnel who did not want “One firm dominating”, 
the same contractor was selected to lead the warship’s development (MoD Senior Manager, 2006). 
This addition to the MoD’s growing list of capital programs represented “Another go at in-service 
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support” and on a significantly larger scale (MoD Commander, 2009). The challenge was to further 
reform existing structures and policy for sharing tasks between the public and private sectors, and 
collectively to identify personnel suited to the team. The CLS initiative helped steer long-term support 
objectives, with the contractor being encouraged to develop costs and milestones. The MoD decided 
to fully outsource logistical support to the private contractor, with fewer yet higher value contracts 
awarded. Admiralty naval headquarters agreed to the idea of a private contractor defining its own 
costs despite being “Nervous that such an innovative support solution might not be able to deliver 
24/7 support, especially in a conflict zone” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011). When the first 
warship was nearly complete, the MoD controversially tried to withdraw the support contract, 
effectively reneging on an initial agreement because of escalating costs (PAC, 2009). The contractor 
argued successfully that given the level of investment by both organizations, it should retain the 
contract and deliver the ship’s support as planned. Despite a period of contractual uncertainty, the 
early phase is characterized by plans for a privately led warship support program (Reid, 2006), 
meaning the contractor had to deliver core elements of the warship’s infrastructure and systems. This 
practice was heralded at the time as resulting in “Closer relationships with both the MoD and 
subcontractors” (Contractor Snr Manager, 2012, ibid). Adopting more responsibility over the whole 
life of the warship meant the contractor increasingly saw itself as brokering supplier relationships and 
encouraging learning through higher levels of interaction, where “Relationships are key.” However, 
the reality of the situation materialized somewhat differently. 
Mid phase (2006-2009) 
When the true scale of the task facing the warship CLS team became apparent, formal coordination 
mechanisms involving the contract were relaxed by the MoD and a more flexible approach was 
adopted towards the contractor. Information technology management skills had to be learned from 
first principle in order to achieve any progress with integrating the warship’s new systems: “The 
support team should have started with a larger pool of people” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011). 
During initial sea trials, further difficulties began to emerge over quoting for the vessel’s support costs 
for a year, much less the 3-5 year period originally specified. Expected seagoing performance was not 
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being met by the new warship due in part to the high levels achieved by the patrol ship. The sheer size 
and complexity of the warship was a major factor in the difficulties over predicting logistical support 
requirements, despite a decade of the MoD encouraging smarter acquisition and supplier partnerships 
(Moore and Antill, 2001). Although heavily involved in other types of military support, the contractor 
had no cross-over mechanisms for sharing experiences between other relevant sea, land, or air force 
support teams. During the now extended trial period, the contractor’s engineers on the warship began 
to understand there were “No shortcuts...we had to apply a lot more rigor with people tweaking 
systems for 6-12 months until [they] reached maturity” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011). 
The engineers responsible for delivering core elements of the support program realized there 
was “A massive load of learning” needed to complete the contract. Management began to understand 
the importance of “More planning for big platforms…more strategic, less tactical thinking” 
(Contractor Snr Manager, 2012, ibid). It was felt that public sector structures were to blame where 
“Everything the MoD does is vertically driven...by department or platform.” Despite concerns over 
rising costs and delays, the relationship was sufficiently established for the two organizations to 
negotiate and agree on the contractor retaining full control of the support contract. The difficulties 
were now alarmingly apparent, yet a level of understanding remained between the MoD and 
contractor, as indicated by the comments of one manager describing the steps being taken to try to 
resolve a dispute during the now protracted development period: “The contract is there, but if we run 
to it all the time that is failure” (Contractor Manager, 2006). 
Late phase (2009-2011) 
Although the warship was by now semi-operational and capable of going to sea for short periods, it 
was falling further behind in the commissioning process, with available days at sea running at only 50 
per cent. The contractor was forced to apply a corrective action approach rather than planned 
procedures. Managers were surprised at the shortness of the allotted ship systems trial periods 
originally provided by the MoD. The original vision of the warship as a model for platform based 
through-life support failed because “It was too hard to define the requirements sufficiently such that 
they could be contracted against” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011). Dysfunctional aspects in the 
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relationship began to re-emerge, despite agreement from the MoD for the contractor to continue with 
the program. There was also indecision on the part of other public departments such as Fleet 
Headquarters on the level of responsibility that could be granted to the contractor. This in turn 
reinforced the view of the contractor of the vertically-driven nature of the MoD, and the sense of a 
cumbersome and overregulated public sector. In one example, the MoD’s policy on preferred 
sovereignty status of UK manufactured equipment became increasingly impractical because of the 
legacy of industrial decline. Increased dependence on overseas suppliers meant the warship was prone 
to further delays, implying original planning was inadequate. 
The late phase of the warship was characterized by poor performance and increasingly 
entrenched positions from both organizations. Despite participation in several high value defence 
contracts and numerous initiatives on collaborative partnerships, the contractor was inconsistent in 
terms of how it worked with other suppliers. Although official policy emphasized mutual benefits, the 
contractor’s approach to specialist suppliers remained short-term and transactional, where “Sub-
contractors don’t get paid…if they don’t deliver!” (Contractor Manager, 2010, ibid). The contractor 
had also become suspicious of defence public sector methods of administration: “MoD procurement 
is always simplistic and over-arching”. The new style of performance-based support contracts 
required more scope for customization by the project team than was actually provided for by the 
MoD. Yet the MoD’s view was to get private firms “To be more flexible and manage their supplier’s 
core capabilities…a core element of this is turning engineers into program managers” (MoD Senior 
Manager, 2006). One manager at the contractor admitted that where private firms were expected to 
lead, further learning and development was required: “We are behind the curve in procurement 
capability” (Contractor Support Manager, 2011). 
The relationship between the MoD and contractor can be summarized during the early phase 
of the new warship as an ambitious and bold collaboration seeking to build on earlier success (Table 
4). Yet, by the mid-phase the contractor realized it had misjudged levels of complexity and resource 
requirements. As the program falls further behind schedule, exchange performance declines between 
the two organizations, with a culture of blame developing over expectations not being met. 
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< Insert ‘Table 4’ about here > 
Analysis and conceptual development  
This section examines governance (dys)function interplay and the effect on exchange performance, 
drawing on within-case analysis (Tables 3 and 4) and cross-case comparison (Table 5) to aid our 
conceptual development. 
In the conceptual background we underlined the view that extant studies do not offer a 
coherent picture of the relationship between governance mechanisms (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). 
Some authors argue that formal and informal governance mechanisms are substitutes (Sitkin and 
Roth, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Nickerson 2008) where contracts and control replace the need 
for setting up and maintaining social relationships, others support their complementary nature (Das 
and Teng, 2001; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) where relationship continuity and ongoing cooperation 
support formal procedures and drive contractual refinements.  
Governance (dys)function interplay  
At a macro level, our study supports the view that formal and informal governance mechanisms are 
complements where we find evidence of both mechanisms at all stages of the relationship lifecycle. 
However, analysis of their (dys)functions over time, and across both sides of the dyad, provides 
evidence of micro-level dynamics that have remained hidden so far. Our discussion highlights these 
dynamics and their potential contribution to theory development.  
First, the additional lens of (dys)functions demonstrates that the two types of governance 
mechanism are not complementary, in the sense that their combination is not uniformly positive. In 
fact, our findings show that the combinations can be negative, as dysfunctions in one type of 
governance mechanism can lead to dysfunctions in the other. Moreover, their relationship can be 
temporarily decoupled whereby, for instance, one party might have functional formal governance and 
dysfunctional informal governance within the same time period. We therefore suggest that the two 
governance mechanisms might be better described as ‘semi-coupled’. Our cases demonstrate that both 
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formal and informal governance are required within inter-organizational relationships (thus 
supporting prior studies; e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Cao and Lumineau, 2015), but that their 
(dys)function or functionality might change over time, which so far has attracted very limited 
conceptual and empirical attention in prior literature. 
Our analysis therefore shifts the focus from the existence of a certain mechanism of 
governance towards its performance. It is particularly interesting that we find situations in which one 
governance mechanism is performing well (functional) but that the other has started to have negative 
effects (dysfunctional) and that the switch between these two modes can occur at any point in the 
relationship lifecycle. For example, we find evidence of early shifts to dysfunctions in the case of the 
warship, and late shifts to functions in the case of the patrol ship, suggesting functions and 
dysfunctions of governance are dynamic and independent. Hence our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: Formal and informal governance mechanisms can become functional or 
dysfunctional over time, and their movement is not connected to movement in the other. 
A second dynamic found in our cases suggests that governance can be convergent, such as that in the 
early phase of the patrol ship, or divergent, such as that in the mid phase of the warship (see Tables 3 
and 4). In other words, what is functional for one side of the dyad can be dysfunctional for the other 
party (and vice-versa). Our approach views the role of function and dysfunction in terms of their 
collective interplay (Lui et al., 2009; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012), and as such commensurate to 
the potential effect of governance mechanisms over time. While the formalization of functional 
contractual control and trustful relations are well recorded in governance literature (e.g. Berends et 
al., 2001; Dyer and Chu, 2003), we observed specific instances of formal and informal dysfunction in 
our cases involving both organizations. Examples of formal dysfunctional behavior include the 
MoD’s limited awareness (Uzzi, 1997) or lack of planning over the impact of transferring risk to the 
private sector, and senior personnel missing the opportunity (Granovetter, 1985) to work on the new 
contract. Informal dysfunctional behavior was demonstrated by the contractor in terms of a tendency 
towards ingrained habits and cognitive lock-in (Gulati, 1995), as reflected in the unsubstantiated 
belief that the buyer might revert to more short-term, cost-based working structures. Formal 
Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms 
21 
 
dysfunction also includes the inability to coordinate a task due to contract incompleteness (Macneil, 
1980), such as the contractor’s view that “It was too hard to define the requirement”. Other informal 
dysfunctions emerge through not honoring obligations to others (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati, 1995) i.e. “Sub-
contractors don’t get paid if they don’t deliver”, which the contractor would not have accepted as 
appropriate behavior towards itself. As an interesting example of unintended consequences, formal 
mechanisms put in place by the MoD to enable the relationship (e.g. defined roles, procedures, 
procurement policy) ultimately worked against it because they were considered “Too cumbersome” by 
the contractor (Beck and Kieser, 2003). Although considered here as stand-alone examples, we 
suggest they are incorporated into the dynamic interplay of functional and dysfunctional behavior, and 
developed in future studies of governance mechanisms:  
Proposition 2: Formal and informal governance mechanisms can be convergent or divergent, 
where what is functional for one side of the dyad can be dysfunctional for the other. 
Impact on exchange performance  
Using functions and dysfunctions, differences are observed between the two cases when considering 
impact on exchange performance. Where both suffer a decline in performance, only one, the patrol 
ship, eventually recovers to achieve 90% sea-time availability, with the warship failing to meet 
expectations. Table 5 presents a cross-case analysis of the two cases, focusing on the patterns of 
(dys)function from the mid phase onward after both experience a decline in performance.  
< Insert ‘Table 5’ about here > 
In terms of exchange performance we observe that the patrol ship displays elements of both formal 
and informal governance mechanisms, with combinations of functional and dysfunctional behavior 
(Table 5). For example, exchange performance is the sum of using a new type of contract to frame 
problem solving (i.e. function: coordination and control), and a decision by the MoD to put the 
contract out to tender, signaling a reversal away from agreed working practices which effectively 
“Burnt a bit of the relationship” with the contractor (i.e. dysfunction: conflict). A difficult first year 
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for the project team with the new contract meant work had to be expedited: “Very painful…with 
arguments…a nightmare”. During this period, the MoD and contractor were blinded by assertions 
around the need for risk to be transferred to industry, and an underlying belief that the public sector 
was fundamentally bureaucratic i.e. “You can cut away whole chunks of bureaucracy.” The 
combination of (dys)functions which ultimately led to high exchange performance for the patrol ship 
case involved not only functional behavior such as roles and responsibilities being formally defined 
(i.e. planning), but also emphasis on informal functions, including partnering (communication & 
information sharing), creation of a project team to co-develop procedures, and establishing the value 
of “Putting the contract to one side” (reduction of formal control). While the above may seem 
intuitive, it is interesting to note the simultaneous switching from function to dysfunction, and the 
combinations of matching or opposing behavior patterns between the MoD and contractor.                 
 In comparison, although the warship case also demonstrates instances of opposing formal and 
informal (dys)functions, unlike the patrol ship case, low exchange performance is the result of a 
preponderance of conflicting, sub-optimal, over-regulated and deterministic behavior (Table 5). While 
there were aims to reform policy around task sharing, with plans to “Incentivize the ship designer and 
builder” (i.e. function: planning), the warship was also perceived as “A very bold initiative” because 
of the level of responsibility for long-term logistical support being granted to the contractor (function: 
codification and sense-making). As the project began to fall behind schedule and the full scale of the 
task became apparent, the corrective action approach adopted was unrealistic (dysfunction: 
deterministic), MoD procurement policy was increasingly considered as outdated (overregulation), 
and conflict began to arise from the MoD’s indecision over what level of responsibility should 
continue to be granted to the contractor: “Everything the MoD does is vertically driven!”  Whereas 
the patrol ship project team adapted their behavior, the warship team’s personnel lacked the skills and 
resources required for the task (sub-optimal search): “We’re behind the curve in terms of procurement 
capability”.  Further, despite concerns over rising costs, the MoD became increasingly entrenched, 
continuing to grant the contractor full control (dysfunctional: binding). Ultimately, exchange 
Converging and Diverging Governance Mechanisms 
23 
 
performance fails on the warship project as the team becomes overwhelmed: “It was too hard to 
define the requirement” (dysfunction: blinding) and increasingly critical of the MoD. 
The ability to gauge exchange performance, particularly mid phase, represents a pivotal point 
in any relationship development. In the two cases, both comprise opposing functional and 
dysfunctional views over contract workability and the importance of maintaining a constructive 
relationship. Yet, ultimately, the warship relationship fails due to indecision and unrealistic 
contractual expectations hampering development, with the result that dysfunctional behavior emerges. 
Our third proposition therefore defines the combined effects of dynamic interplay and governance 
mechanisms on relationship exchange performance: 
Proposition 3: Relationship exchange performance is a function of the management of 
(dys)functions  over time, rather than their nature as complements or substitutes. 
Adopting a systematic approach to the interplay of governance mechanism (dys)functions enables 
more informed discussions around the nature of long-term relationships and their impact on exchange 
performance. Our study reveals not only outcomes in terms of exchange performance (i.e. low, high), 
but more critically the causes of change in performance through combinations of (dys)functional 
formal and informal behavior during each relationship phase. Thus a richer, more engaging narrative 
(Weick, 1995) can be woven around participant organizations to capture events as they unfold in time, 
aided by our function-dysfunction matrix style analysis, which provides for a more structured and 
game theoretic perspective to the study of governance (Jones et al., 1997). Using this approach we 
identify matching and opposing combinations of governance dysfunctions, similar to the dialectic 
perspective of Vlaar et al., (2007) or meta analytic investigation by Cao and Lumineau (2015), 
revealing an interesting twist in the interpretation of our findings. Generally the received wisdom 
where both organizations do not agree on governance mechanisms is a decline in performance. 
However, our conclusions drawn from the notion of governance (dys)functions are less delineated in 
terms of impact on exchange performance. Both our cases start with initially matching functional 
formal and informal behavior, but then suffer a decline during their mid phase. Yet, this decline is not 
M. Howard, J. Roehrich, M. Lewis and B. Squire 
determined directly by whether each organization’s governance mechanism (dys)functions match or 
oppose the other, but by the cumulative effect on the relationship as a whole.  
Adopting a longitudinal, three phase (i.e. early, mid, late) perspective also means our findings 
provide some evidence of the factors involved in inter-organizational relationship recovery during 
complex programs. Comparing the two cases, high performance was achieved where formal and 
informal governance mechanisms were considered together, for instance through definition of roles 
and responsibilities, co-creating policy on team behavior, freer information exchange at the outset, 
framing of problems using the contract, and shared process development. We argue that relationships 
can withstand and even benefit from some degree of dysfunctional behavior, illustrated by the MoD 
nearly reneging on its agreement on the warship support contract, although the prolonged effects of 
dysfunction over the long-term ultimately leads to a decline in exchange performance.  
Conclusion 
This paper conceptually and empirically explores the roles of governance mechanisms and the 
dynamic interplay of functions and dysfunctions over time in complex inter-organizational 
relationships (Guérard et al., 2013; Cao and Lumineau, 2015). We argue although varying degrees of 
formalization is important when managing long-term relationships, organizations should learn not 
only to contract or build up trusting relations, but consider both together as semi-coupled in terms of 
the impact such interplay has on exchange performance. The received wisdom is where both 
organizations do not agree on the governance mechanisms to use, the result is a negative impact. 
However, our conclusions suggest that mismatches can be positive as well as negative, and it is the 
overall relationship atmosphere that determines the direction of the (dys)functions. In building a 
context dependent understanding of governance, we both uncover the (dys)functions associated with 
formal and informal governance mechanisms, and explore their impact on relationship exchange 
performance over time.  
The practical implications for managing contracts are also raised. Cost-cutting is often cited 
as the reason that complex contracts are outsourced and public organizations rely more on private 
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suppliers to deliver outcome-based support solutions (Sherman, 2013; Jones et al., 2014). Such 
thinking shifts the challenge of long-term relationships and associated skills development squarely 
onto the shoulders of contractors. Increasing dependency on the private sector and the potential for 
negotiation begs questions around the enforcement of contracts, learning and relationship recovery in 
an increasingly limited market of skilled organizations. In order to maintain exchange performance in 
long-term inter-organizational relationships therefore, we argue managers must learn not just how to 
engineer solutions, but identify pathways through the dynamic interplay of governance (dys)functions. 
In terms of limitations, our study focuses on two inter-organizational relationships over time 
to offer a more fine-grained perspective on governance interplay. We acknowledge that our findings 
may not be generalizable (or not so explicitly as presented here) outside the defence maritime setting. 
We suggest that further research examines the ‘tipping points’ and managerial interventions that can 
prevent dysfunctions from emerging. Researchers could also explore the impact of the wider market 
environment and network on the focal inter-organizational relationship and governance mechanisms 
interplay. For instance, future studies should explore the impact of foreign ownership on governance 
and performance and the impact of differences in formal/regulatory institutions (e.g. Cummings et al., 
2017). Moreover, future studies may also explore how do external agents such as governments, NGOs 
and regulatory institutions influence the interplay of governance mechanisms? And, are certain 
functions or dysfunctions emphasized by the wider stakeholder network? While these long-term 
relationships provided an ideal setting for investigating concepts such as governance over time, 
further research should investigate (dys)functions and the interplay in short-term relationships on an 
inter-personal and team level. 
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Figures and Tables  
Table 1. Function and Dysfunction in Governance Mechanisms 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Intended Function Potential Dysfunction 
Formal 
 
 
Coordination & control  
Decomposition of tasks and alignment 
of activities to reduce impact of 
individual biases and judgement errors 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Klein 
Woolthius et al., 2005). 
 
Intended to mitigate negative behaviour 
and opportunism (Carson et al., 2006; 
Lui, 2009; Möllering, 2005) 
 
Clarification of roles and 
responsibilities (Lui, 2009). 
 
Planning 
Increases the perceived predictability of 
social actors’ future behaviour and 
activities (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Poppo and Zender, 2002; Stipanowich, 
1998). 
 
Codification & sense-making 
Offers codification of behaviour; leads 
to degrees of certainty and stability; 
focus attention and reflection upon 
issues (Klein Woolthius et al., 2005; 
Das and Teng, 2001). 
Deterministic 
Inhibiting creativity, flexibility and 
innovation due to overregulation and 
prescribing process in detail (Ring and 
Van der Ven, 1994; Mintzberg, 1994; 
Nooteboom, 1999; Volberda, 1998). 
 
Unilateral dependence, hold-up problems, 
conflict and disagreement due to 
incomplete/inaccurate contracts (MacNeil, 
1980; Anderson and Decker, 2005). 
 
 
 
Overregulation 
‘Cumbersome, overregulated, and 
impersonal processes’ (Beck and Kieser, 
2003, p. 794; Weibel 2007). 
 
 
 
Conflict 
Can lead to conflict where processes and 
procedures are incomplete/inaccurate 
(Luo, 2002; Malhotra and Lumineau, 
2011). 
Informal 
 
 
Communication & Information Sharing 
Generates and maintains social 
interaction (Bachmann, 2001; Das and 
Teng, 2001; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Gulati, 1995). 
 
Reduction of formal control costs 
Lubricant of economic exchange’ and 
coordination mechanism (Dyer and 
Chu, 2003; Inkpen and Curral, 2004; 
Knights et al., 2001; Schepker et al., 
2014). 
 
Reduction of uncertainty 
Increases the perceived predictability of 
social actors’ future behaviour 
(Luhman, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002). 
 
 
Suboptimal search 
Limited awareness of market 
developments or opportunities from 
quality of information used in decision 
(Locke, 1999; Grover et al., 2006). 
 
Binding  
(‘Cognitive lock-in’; ‘relational inertia’) 
Can lead to honouring obligations that 
may conflict with the pursuit of self-
interest; risk avoidance (Uzzi, 1997; 
Gulati, 1995; Poppo et al., 2008). 
 
Blinding  
(‘Loss of objectivity’) can lead to missed 
market opportunities (e.g. new 
innovations) by focussing on too narrow a 
set of criteria (Anderson and Jap, 2005; 
Granovetter, 1985; Villena et al., 2011). 
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Table 2, Appendix. Research interviews (2005-2012) 
No. Interviewee position or rank Organization Month / Yr 
1 Senior advisor to MoD DERA 05.05 
2 Commander, Flight training Royal Navy 06.05 
3 Commander, Administration Royal Navy 06.05 
4 Lieutenant, Procurement Royal Air Force 07.05 
5 Senior staff officer (Retired) Royal Navy 10.05 
6 Executive director  DPA 11.05 
7 Communications DLO 12.05 
8 Director, Supply chain Contractor 03.06 
9 Chief Engineer  Contractor 04.06 
10 Chief Engineer Contractor 04.06 
11 Manager Contractor 05.06 
12 Director DPA 05.06 
13 Director Contractor 05.06 
14 Director (Retired)  Contractor 06.06 
15 Director, Logistics DLO 06.06 
16 Project Manager  Contractor 06.06 
17 Director  Contractor 06.06 
18 Senior Manager DPA 08.06 
19 Consultant Contractor 03.07 
20 Managing Director Defence association 11.07 
21 Business Development Manager Contractor 07.08 
22 Business Director, Aerospace Contractor 08.08 
23 Director Contractor 10.08 
24 Defence Research RUSI 01.09 
25 Captain  MoD / Royal Navy 02.09 
26 Technical Director Contractor 04.09 
27 Commander MoD / Royal Navy 05.09 
28 Turbine Group Leader MoD 07.09 
29 Ship Support Director MoD 07.09 
30 Managing Director Contractor 08.09 
31 Manager MoD 12.09 
32 Chief Executive Defence association 12.09 
33 Manager Contractor 02.10 
34 Admiral Royal Navy 02.10 
35 Procurement / Design  Contractor 01.11 
36 Submarine Support Contractor 04.11 
37 Support Manager Contractor 11.11 
38 Senior Manager DE&S 03.12 
39 Assistant Director Procurement  (Rtd) DPA / DE&S 04.12 
40 Senior Manager Ship support DE&S 04.12 
 
 
 
Key to abbreviations:  
MoD Ministry of Defence 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute 
DERA Defence Evaluation & Research Agency 
DPA Defence Procurement Agency 
DLO Defence Logistics Agency 
DE&S Defence Equipment and Supply  
